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Abstract 
Overprecision (overconfidence in interval estimation) is a bias 
with clear implications for economic outcomes in industries 
reliant on forecasting possible ranges for future prices and 
unknown states of nature - such as mineral and petroleum 
exploration. Prior research has shown the ranges people 
provide are too narrow given the knowledge they have – that 
is, they underestimate uncertainty and are overconfident in 
their knowledge. The underlying causes of this bias are, 
however, still unclear and individual differences research has 
shed little light on traits predictive of susceptibility. Taking 
this as a starting point, this paper directly contrasts the Naïve 
Sampling Model and Informativeness-Accuracy Tradeoff 
accounts of overprecision – seeing which better predicts 
performance in an interval estimation task. This was achieved 
by identifying traits associated with these theories – Short 
Term Memory and Need for Cognitive Closure, respectively. 
Analyses indicate that NFCC but not STM predicts interval 
width and thus, potentially, impacts overprecision. 
Keywords: confidence; overprecision; need for cognitive 
closure; STM; informativeness; naïve sampling model. 
Introduction 
Overprecision, the form overconfidence observed on 
interval estimation tasks, has been described as the most 
robust yet least understood form of overconfidence (Moore 
& Healey, 2008). It occurs where people provide confidence 
intervals (lower and upper bounds between which they are 
confident, to a stated degree, that an unknown value lies). If, 
over a set of questions asking for (e.g.) 90% confidence 
intervals, objective accuracy levels are lower than 90%, this 
is deemed overprecision (Alpert & Raffia, 1982; Moore & 
Healey, 2008). It differs from overestimation, observed on 
point estimates when post-item confidence judgements 
exceed accuracy, as point estimate accuracy improves with 
task experience, while range estimate accuracy does not, 
implying different underlying processes (Hansson, Juslin & 
Winman, 2008). People show pronounced overprecision on 
interval estimation tasks - that is, far fewer ranges contain 
the true value than expected based on the stated level of 
confidence (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff & Phillips, 1982). 
Overprecision is of applied significance in engineering, 
mining and the oil and gas industry, which all make use of 
estimates delivered in this form (Moore, Tenney & Haran, 
2015), with valuation errors of hundreds of millions of 
dollars resulting (Welsh, Begg & Bratvold, 2007).  
The basic cause of overprecision is people generating 
intervals too narrow to reflect their degree of subjective 
uncertainty, failing to capture the true value as often as 
expected (Alpert & Raffia, 1982). The effect is resistant to 
debiasing, with participants exhorted to widen their intervals 
failing to do so enough to achieve good, much less perfect, 
calibration (e.g. Yaniv & Foster, 1995). 
Factors contributing to overprecision, however, are poorly 
understood and, while task characteristics and debiasing 
techniques have attracted significant interest, individual 
differences in performance have received little attention, 
with only two recent studies relating individual differences 
to interval estimation performance (Haran, Ritov & Mellers, 
2013; Hilton, Regner, Cabantous, Charalambides and 
Vautier, 2011). This study addresses this deficit by selecting 
individual differences relating to two promising theories of 
overprecision, the Naïve Sampling Model (NSM) and the 
Informativeness-Accuracy Tradeoff (IAT; Juslin, Winman 
& Hansson, 2007; Yaniv and Foster, 1995; 1997). 
Naïve Sampling Model (NSM) 
The NSM explains overprecision cognitively - as a 
consequence of short term memory (STM) capacity. The 
underlying concept being that, to create an interval, a person 
calls relevant examples from long term memory (LTM). For 
instance, if asked to set an interval around the population of 
Nigeria, one might call to mind populations of other African 
countries (or, failing that, non-African countries). 
This sample, held in STM, is then used as the basis for 
creating the interval estimate – for example, by taking the 
10th and 90th percentiles of that sample and using these as 
the low and high ends of an 80% confidence interval. The 
sample drawn from LTM, however, is limited by a person’s 
STM to a small number of instances and, as sampling 
dispersion is a biased estimator of population dispersion, 
80% coverage of the sample does not correspond to 80% 
coverage of the population – leading to too narrow ranges. 
 
Individual Differences in NSM. NSM holds that better 
STM decreases overprecision due to increased interval 
width - as larger samples are less likely to underestimate 
population dispersion. Support for a reduction of 
overprecision due to STM was found in a study involving a 
learning and then a testing phase - but interval width was 
not explicitly measured (Hansson et al., 2008).  
 
Informativeness-Accuracy Tradeoff (IAT) 
The IAT is a motivational explanation of people’s 
preferences when receiving and generating interval 
estimates (Yaniv & Foster, 1995; 1997). In interval 
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estimation terms, narrow intervals are more informative but, 
holding all else equal, less likely to be accurate, while wide 
intervals are less informative and more accurate. Thus, these 
objectives need to be traded off against one another. 
 Yaniv and Foster’s (1995; 1997) participants showed a 
general preference for receiving informative (narrow) 
interval estimates that missed the true value rather than 
uninformative (broad) estimates containing it, stating that 
these were more ‘useful’ than the wider estimates.  
Participants also produced intervals containing the true 
value far less often than the stated 95% confidence level, 
and when informed of the degree to which their intervals 
would need expanding to contain the true values often 
enough, opined that this would render the judgements 
useless to the receiver (Yaniv & Foster, 1995; 1997).  
The regulation of informativeness-accuracy thus follows 
conversational norms (Yaniv & Foster, 1995; 1997) - in 
providing a judgement, estimators are attempting to help the 
receiver. The receiver’s purpose in soliciting a judgement 
should guide the relative informativeness or accuracy of the 
estimator (Yaniv & Foster, 1995; 1997). 
A key contribution of this theory is the decomposition of 
intervals into width (upper minus lower bound) and absolute 
error (distance from the interval’s midpoint to the true 
value), with width thought to reflect strategy (how 
informative or precise an estimator is claiming to be) while 
absolute error reflects knowledge (Yaniv & Foster, 1997). 
  
Individual Differences in IAT. The conversational norms 
explanation for regulation of informativeness-accuracy in 
interval estimation has received limited support, with 
attempts to manipulate receiver purpose not affecting 
overprecision. Nor is it clear why communications between 
experimenter and participant should induce informative 
rather than accurate responses (Haran, Radzevick & Moore, 
2010, cited in Moore, Tenney and Haran, 2015).   
 A novel explanation is that people may be predisposed to 
informative or accurate judgments by innate thinking 
dispositions such as Need for Cognitive Closure (NFCC) - 
defined as the desire to answer a question rather than 
sustaining further uncertainty (Webster & Kruglanski, 
1994). Wide intervals are necessarily ambiguous, and it may 
be that high-NFCC participants would produce narrow 
intervals to avoid ambiguity and attain a feeling of closure.  
Additionally, low NFCC is qualitatively similar to high 
Actively Open-minded Thinking (AOT), which predicted 
reduced overprecision on a single interval estimate (Haran 
et al., 2013). NFCC is preferable, however, as it includes 
discomfort with ambiguity, which AOT does not, and the 
NFCC scales are better validated than those for the AOT. 
Online Confidence  
Given uncertainty regarding the causes of overprecision, 
online confidence (OC) – the average post-item confidence 
ratings from a  12-item form of the Raven’s APM test 
(Arthur & Day, 1994) - was also used as a predictor in this 
study. OC is thought to reflect a stable confidence trait 
across domains, shown to be predictive of performance 
within a domain - such as, online confidence from an earlier 
English test predicting end-of-year English grades (Stankov, 
Lee, Luo & Hogan, 2012) - but not yet across domains.  
Hypotheses 
1. Better STM will result in wider intervals and reduce 
overprecision. (NSM hypothesis) 
2.Higher NFCC will result in narrowed intervals and 
increase overprecision (IAT hypothesis).      
3. Higher online confidence will predict reduced 
overprecision (confidence-overprecision hypothesis). 
Method 
Participants 
Participants (n = 49, 29 females, mean age = 31.0 years, SD 
= 15.5) were drawn from University of Adelaide students 
and the general population. They were highly educated, with 
87% of participants having attempted a Bachelor’s degree. 
Psychology 1B students participated for course credit and 
others entered in a draw to win one of two $50 gift cards. 
Materials  
Digit Span (STM capacity) Forward digit span, adapted 
from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales (Wechlser, 
2008), measured STM capacity. To ease data collection, the 
task was administered in groups. Participants were read lists 
of numbers as per the standard digit span procedure but 
provided written rather than verbal responses. The two 
response methods have been shown to produce similar 
scores within subjects (Ryan, Townsend & Kreiner, 2014).  
 There were two trials at each span level, 16 trials in all, 
ranging from two digits to nine digits in length. Each trial 
number was read out, e.g. “Trial 1”, followed by a four 
second break, after which the digits were read out at a rate 
of one per second. Once all participants had finished writing 
their response, the next trial was announced and the process 
repeated until all 16 trials had been administered. A 
participant’s score was the last span level at which they 
were correct on at least one of the two trials. 
 
Need for Cognitive Closure Scale 15-item. A fifteen-item 
scale derived from the revised 41-item NFCC scale (Roets 
& Van Hiel, 2007) was used to generate the general NFCC 
factor (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). Participants rated 
statements such as “I don’t like situations that are uncertain” 
on a six-point Likert scale from 1, strongly disagree, to 6, 
strongly agree. Scores summed from all items give scores 
from 15 to 90 with higher scores indicating greater NFCC.  
 
Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices 12-item. 
Raven’s is a 36-item measure of fluid intelligence for use 
with highly-educated samples but was used here to derive 
OC. Arthur and Day’s (1994) 12-item version was used, 
untimed, and a participant’s score was simply their number 
of correct answers. After each item, participants provided 
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confidence ratings (0-100%) for the accuracy of their 
answer, which were averaged as the measure of OC.  
 
General Knowledge Interval Estimates (Overprecision). 
Twenty general knowledge questions were used to assess 
overprecision in interval estimation. Participants made 80% 
confidence estimates in accordance with the oil and gas 
industry standard (Welsh, Bratvold & Begg 2005), and saw 
an example question to learn the required response format. 
Four topic areas were used; geography, sport, big business 
and historical events, with five questions from each topic. In 
theory, question content is unimportant as optimum 
performance involves scaling intervals to accord with the 
precision of knowledge, not knowing exact answers to the 
questions. However, participants often react with frustration 
when they find questions too difficult or topics unfamiliar 
(Welsh et al., 2005) and, thus, a range of topics was used. 
Bias Score. Bias score was used as the measure of overall 
overprecision, calculated as the given confidence level (i.e., 
0.8) minus the proportion correct. Perfect calibration would 
result in a bias score of 0, overprecision a positive bias score 
and underprecision a negative bias score. 
Interval Width. Interval width was measured by 
subtracting an estimate’s upper from its lower bound. As 
width is relative to the scale of the correct answer, 
participant’s ranges were ranked from widest to narrowest 
(i.e. widest = 1) for each item, using average ranks for ties. 
Participant’s mean rank across the 20 questions was used in 
analyses. Scores closer to 1 thus indicate participant’s 
intervals that were, typically, wider than other participants.  
Absolute Error. This was calculated as the absolute 
difference between the true value and the interval midpoint. 
Absolute error was calculated as described for interval 
width but values were ranked smallest to largest (i.e. least 
absolute error = 1), ensuring higher interval width and 
absolute errors both correspond to greater overprecision. 
Procedure 
Participants first completed the digit span test and gave 
demographic information before undertaking the interval 
estimation task. They were told to remind themselves when 
reading each estimation question that they should be 80% 
sure that the true value was between the low and high 
bounds they provided. After the interval estimates, 
participants completed the NFCC scale and then the 
Raven’s APM. All tests were conducted using pencil and 
paper and completion time was 30-45 minutes.  
Results 
Given the small sample, Efron’s (1987) BCa bootstrap 
procedure with 2000 resamples was used to calculate 
statistics in addition to traditional methods. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for all continuous 
variables, revealing that participants displayed the expected 
pattern of overprecision in their interval estimates, with a 
mean bias score of .51. The degree of miscalibration is on 
the high end of that observed in other studies, with hit rates 
around 30% at a pre-stated confidence level of 80%. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for all continuous variables. 
 M SD Min. Max. 
Age 31.04 15.45 18 80 
Digit Span 6.92 1.35 4 9 
NFCC 57.06 10.80 38 82 
Online Confidence 67.68 18.34 17.5 100 
Raven’s APM 7.88 2.76 2 12 
Bias Score .51 .17 .00 .80 
Interval Width 25.00 6.64 11.33 39.55 
Absolute Error 25.00 5.23 14.23 42.70 
 
Table 2 present a correlation matrix for these variables - 
excepting between bias score, interval width and absolute 
error, due to their statistical dependency.  
 
Table 2: Correlation matrix for all continuous variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1 Age -     
2 DS -.10 -    
3 NFCC .04 -.20 -   
4 OC -.28 .13 -.24 -  
5 RAPM -.36 .20 -.34 .67 - 
6 Bias Score .09 -.06 .32 -.10 -.27 
7 Int. Width .30 -.27 .40 -.24 -.38 
8 Abs. Err. -.25 .13 .06 .12 -.01 
Bold = p ≤ .05. DS = digit span; NFCC = need for cognitive 
closure; OC = online confidence; RAPM = Ravens APM. 
 
Looking at Table 2, one can see three major points 
relating to our hypotheses. The first is that online 
confidence is closely related to the people’s scores on the 
Ravens (as would be expected) but not significantly related 
to any of the three overprecision measures (bias, width or 
error). The second is that digit span seems similarly 
unrelated – although the relationship between digit span and 
interval width, at -0.27, approaches significance. Finally, 
NFCC is significantly correlated with the bias score and 
more strongly with interval width but not absolute error. 
 Beyond our hypotheses, it is worth noting the significant 
negative relationship between participants Ravens scores 
and interval widths – due, perhaps, to the fact that age 
negatively predicts people’s online confidence and Raven’s 
scores and is positively related to interval width. 
The above examination of correlations suggests that 
NFCC predicts overprecision bias and interval width 
whereas digit span and online confidence do not. This 
piecemeal approach, however, ignores potential 
relationships between the predictors. Therefore, multiple 
regressions were conducted as a means of examining all 
three potential predictors of overprecision simultaneously. 
Interval Width 
Table 3 displays the results of a multiple linear regression 
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conducted to test the hypotheses that: STM capacity, as 
measured by digit span, would be related to the production 
of wider intervals; that NFCC level would be related to the 
production of narrower intervals; and that online confidence 
would be related to the production of wider intervals.  
The model reached significance, F(3,45) = 4.17, p< .05, 
R2 = .22, with NFCC as the only significant predictor. The 
hypothesis that higher NFCC score would be related to the 
production of narrower intervals was supported, however 
the wide bootstrap CI95 for the regression coefficient makes 
the true strength of the relationship difficult to ascertain.  
 
Table 3: Multiple linear regression analysis predicting 
interval width from digit span, NFCC and online confidence 
 
 B SE β t p 
  BCa CI95    
 
DS -.95 [-2.30, .30] .72 -.19 -1.43 ns 
NFCC .20 [.07, .32] .07 .33* 2.39 <.05 
OC -.05 [-.16, .09] .06 -.13 -.99 ns 
 
In contrast, the hypothesis that high STM would result in 
wider intervals was not supported. The (n.s.) relationship 
observed was, in fact, opposite to that predicted. Likewise, 
online confidence failed to predict interval width. 
Overprecision 
The above analyses support the supposition that NFCC 
predicts interval width but the degree to which this results in 
overprecision bias is, perhaps, more important to know. 
Table 4 displays results of a multiple linear regression 
conducted to test the hypotheses that: STM capacity (i.e. 
digit span) would be related to reduced overprecision; that 
NFCC would be related to increased overprecision; and that 
online confidence would predict reduced overprecision. 
The model did not reach significance, F(3,45) = 1.75, p = 
.17, R2 = .10. Despite the significant correlation between 
NFCC and bias score in Table 2, NFCC was not a 
significant predictor of overprecision in this model - and 
none of the three hypotheses found support. 
 
Table 4: Multiple linear regression analysis predicting bias 
score from digit span, NFCC, online confidence and Ravens 
 
 B   SE β t p 
  BCa CI95   
 
 
DS .001 [-.04 .04] .021 .01 .04 ns 
NFCC .005 [.001, .009] .002 .32 2.16 ns 
OC .000 [-.003, .002] .001 -.02 -.14 ns 
Discussion 
These results go some way in helping to decide between 
two promising theories of overprecision: the Naïve 
Sampling Model (NSM, Juslin et al., 2007); and the 
Informativeness-Accuracy Trade-off (IAT, Yaniv & Foster, 
1995; 1997) with some support offered for the latter - at 
least, to the extent that one accepts that NFCC reflects an 
intrinsic tendency to prefer informativeness over accuracy. 
A third possible predictor of overprecision – online 
confidence (Stankov et al., 2012) – showed no clear 
relationship with overprecision, suggesting that these forms 
of confidence and overconfidence are not closely related. 
STM Capacity 
The idea that superior STM causes the production of wider 
intervals and thus reduces overprecision is central to the 
Naïve Sampling Model (NSM: Juslin et al., 2007). Thus, 
this study showing no effect of STM on interval width and 
failing to replicate Hansson et al.’s (2008) finding that STM 
predicted reduced overprecision presents a challenge to the 
theory as described (although it does not rule out the 
possibility of other sampling processes providing a sound 
explanation of the interval estimation process).   
These results appear not to be STM measurement issues, 
as the digit span test used here produced the expected ‘seven 
plus-or-minus two’ pattern of results (Miller, 1956). There 
may, though, be other explanations for why this study failed 
to support Hansson et al.’s (2008) assumptions and findings. 
Firstly, forward digit span, as used in this study, measures 
only STM. The digit span task used in Hansson et al. 
(2008), however, is described as a composite (via an 
unstated formula) of a passive repeat-back task (presumably 
forward span) and a sequencing task, which are thought to 
reflect working memory in addition to capacity (Engle, 
Tuholski, Laughlin & Conway; 1999). Thus, Hansson et 
al.’s (2008) scale may have measured working memory and 
STM, affecting the relationship they observed. The positive 
correlation Hansson et al. (2008) observed between digit 
span and Raven’s APM was stronger than seen herein, 
consistent with the notion that the more complex span task 
may have led to a stronger relationship with working 
memory, which is more closely related to Gf – as measured 
by Raven’s APM (Wiley, Jarosz, Cushen & Colflesh, 2011).  
Secondly, the general-knowledge interval estimation used 
herein differed significantly from the laboratory learning 
task used by Hansson et al. (2008) in that it did not control 
for prior knowledge. Hansson et al.’s (2008) task involved a 
learning phase of fictitious company data, followed by an 
estimates phase wherein participants made a point estimate, 
thought to reflect information successfully stored in LTM if 
correct, and an interval estimate at the 80% probability 
level, thought to reflect inference from STM if correct.  
Their results suggested that STM capacity as assessed by 
digit span was negatively related to overprecision but 
proportion of correctly recalled values from LTM was not. 
This was interpreted as evidence for the importance of STM 
capacity as compared to information stored in LTM in 
generating correct interval estimates (Hansson et al., 2008). 
However, the strongest predictor of overprecision was the 
variance of the values correctly recalled from LTM, which 
could be assessed by comparing the values recalled to the 
distribution of values from the learning phase. Those in the 
low-variance group after a median split were almost twice 
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as overprecise as those in the high-variance group, pointing 
to the possibility of a role for information stored in LTM.  
Controlling for prior knowledge is necessary to 
demonstrate the theorised dissociation between STM 
capacity and LTM information storage but such a task is not 
representative of real world estimation tasks.  
Of interest - in light of this study’s results - is the finding 
that low-variance LTM representations were associated with 
increased overprecision (Hansson et al., 2008). It is possible 
that when prior knowledge is not controlled, as in general 
knowledge questions as used in this study, between-subjects 
differences in LTM representations may obscure the 
relationship between STM capacity and overprecision. 
However, were STM’s predictive power to be realized only 
in laboratory settings where prior knowledge is controlled, 
the utility of NSM for applied settings must be questioned.  
Need for Cognitive Closure 
The hypothesis that higher NFCC would correlate with 
production of narrower intervals was supported but the 
effect of this on a person’s level of overprecision was mixed 
– supported in the correlation table but not in the multiple 
regression. This is, perhaps, unsurprising as overall bias is 
also affected by differences in individual knowledge and 
any effect on interval width is diluted by the inclusion of 
errors in estimation, which NFCC does not predict.  
The results offer support for interpreting the NFCC trait 
as per Webster and Kruglanski (1994), which led to the 
presumption that it might be linked to a preference for 
informativeness over accuracy. They also support a 
qualitative similarity between low NFCC and high AOT, as 
low-NFCC participants in this study behaved like high-AOT 
participants in Haran et al. (2013). NFCC could be 
considered a complimentary construct to AOT given its 
significant relationship with interval width, which was not 
predicted by AOT in Haran et al. (2013).    
Overall, the fact that a dispositional variable (NFCC) was 
the best predictor of both interval width and, despite the 
model not reaching statistical significant, overprecision, 
argues for an account of overprecision including 
motivational and strategic aspects rather than a purely 
cognitive one. It is, thus, broadly supportive of the 
principles of the Informativeness-Accuracy Tradeoff’s 
overprecision explanation (Yaniv & Foster, 1995; 1997). 
The theoretical link drawn here between NFCC and IAT 
thus seems to have been sensible; although the mechanism 
underpinning this requires elucidation, these findings should 
stimulate further research into NFCC and, more generally, 
the role of intrinsic motivators as drivers of the IAT. 
Future Directions 
Few studies have examined overprecision on interval 
estimates from an individual differences perspective and, so, 
these results suggest multiple directions for future research. 
A first, drawing on results in Table 2, will be to nail down 
the relationships between age and the various confidence, 
intelligence and bias measures examined herein. 
Naïve Sampling Model This study did not support NSM’s 
ability to explain overprecision – at least in cases where 
estimates are made in contexts without controlled prior 
knowledge. Follow up research into the effects of task 
features on NSM is therefore necessary to clarify its utility. 
A future study could examine predictions of NSM in a 
within-subjects design, with conditions having different 
levels of control over prior knowledge, shedding light on the 
utility of NSM outside the laboratory. Additional work 
utilizing separate measures of working memory and STM 
could also help disentangle possible confounds,  while 
investigating the ability of other sampling processes to 
explain overprecision would help clarify the worth of 
further developing sampling-based models of overprecision. 
 
Need for Cognitive Closure As a new construct to the 
interval estimation field, many aspects of NFCC bear further 
investigation. Understanding the mechanisms underlying the 
association between high NFCC, the production of narrower 
intervals, and a potential relationship with increased 
overprecision is important. Thus, use of the 41-item revised 
scale - which includes subscales - (Roets & Van Hiel, 2007) 
in future research would be a sensible starting point.  
Also relevant are moderators that might affect how those 
high or low in NFCC behave. The link between NFCC and 
interval estimates posited here was that wide intervals are 
ambiguous and high-NFCC participants would avoid 
ambiguity - providing narrower intervals. However, an 
alternative explanation could be drawn from the literature 
on NFCC and information search. Specifically, rather than 
trying to reduce affective discomfort caused by ambiguity, 
participants may simply not search for enough information 
to make credible estimates, as the perceived cost of 
information search is too high. Research on NFCC and 
information search suggests those high in NFCC search for 
less information and make faster decisions but the opposite 
pattern of behaviour can manifest under certain conditions 
(Choi, Koo, Choi & Auh, 2008; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 
2002). Variables moderating the association between NFCC 
and information search should, therefore, be investigated. 
For example, those low in ability to achieve closure, 
perceived ability to enact strategies to fulfil epistemic needs, 
and those with a low working memory capacity (WMC) 
may behave conversely to that suggested by their NFCC 
level, with high NFCC people prolonging information 
search and suspending closure and low NFCC people 
shortening it to achieve rapid closure (Czernatowicz-
Kukuczka, Jasko & Kossowksa, 2014; Kossowska & Bar-
Tal, 2013). The apparent relevance of WMC to the NSM 
and to the relationship between NFCC and information 
search may, thus, provide a path to integrating motivational 
and cognitive theories of overprecision.  
The effect of moderators on the relationship between 
NFCC and information search paints a complex picture. A 
more nuanced view of the relationship between NFCC, 
interval width and overprecision may appear when 
moderators of NFCC behaviour are also measured. 
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Conclusion 
The key finding of this paper is that NFCC, introduced as a 
possible measure of a person’s preference for 
informativeness over accuracy in line with Yaniv and 
Foster’s (1995;1997) IAT theory does predict overprecision 
in interval estimation – or, at least, the interval width aspect 
of this bias. Equally interesting is its failure to support the 
central assumption of the NSM account of overprecision. 
The results, therefore, point to the need to consider 
motivation and strategy in addition to the potential impact 
of cognitive processes when examining overprecision.  
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